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NOTES
Medical Surveillance Damages: A Solution to the
Inadequate Compensation of Toxic Tort Victims
INTRODUCTION
Individuals exposed to toxic substances' encounter almost insurmountable
legal and practical barriers in recovering for injuries resulting from their
exposure. Under traditional tort law principles, an individual exposed to a
toxic substance has suffered no legally recognized injury entitling her to
compensation until she manifests a detectable disease.2 Courts have rejected
toxic tort plaintiffs' attempts to circumvent the present injury requirement
by seeking compensation for either an increased risk of developing a future
disease or the mental anguish resulting from the fear of developing a future
ailment, such as cancer. Requiring toxic tort plaintiffs to postpone litigation
until a latent disease actually manifests itself is not a viable alternative. The
barriers presented by statutes of limitation, statutes of repose, the difficulty
of proving causation, or a variety of other practical problems make a future
recovery unlikely. Furthermore, even if toxic tort victims could recover in
future actions, delaying the litigation undermines the tort system's deterrence
1. Toxic substances are any chemical, biological, biochemical or radioactive materials that
cause an immediate or long-term harm to people, animals or the environment. Examples of
toxic substances include: Asbestos, Agent Orange, Benzene, Diethyestibestrol (DES), Dioxin,
Formaldehyde, Radiation, and Vinyl Chloride. See McGovern, Toxic Substances Litigation in
theFourth Circuit, 16 U. RICH. L. REv. 247, 247 n.l (1982); Rosenberg, The Causal Connection
in Mass Exposure Cases: A "Public Law" Vision of the Tort System, 97 Hnv. L. Rv. 851,
851 n.2 (1984).
2. See W. KEETON, D. DoaBs, R. KEETON & D. OwENs, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE
LAW OF TORTS § 30, at 165 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER AND KEaTON] ("The threat of
future harm, not yet realized, is not enough."). Ordinarily, exposure to a toxic substance does
not result in detectable physical injuries. Most diseases caused by toxic substances, cancer for
example, are insidious and have long latency periods before manifestation. See Rosenberg,
supra note 1, at 852 n.3; Comment, Occupational Carcinogenesis and Statutes of Limitation:
Resolving Relevant Policy Goals, 10 ENvmL. L. 113, 115 n.7 (1979). See also SuPrm-uND
SECTION 301(e) STUDy GROUP, 97TH CONG., 2o SEss., INtnuas .AND DA/mAGEs FROM HAZARDous
WAsT s-AN.,LYsis AND ImpRovEmENT OF LEOAL REIEms 43 (Comm. Print 1982) [hereinafter
SuPERFuND STY GROUP] (primary authors Frank P. Grad and Patricia A. Porter).
3. See M. Doa, LAW OF ToxIC TORTS: LmroAToN/DEsa~sE/INsUR.CaC § 2.02 (1987)
(listing ten major characteristics of toxic torts).
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and compensation objectives. 4 The recognition of a pre-manifestation cause
of action is therefore imperative.
To remove these recovery barriers, solutions which include major changes
in the tort system, alternative compensation systems, administrative pro-
grams, and legislative action have been proposed. While these proposals
have been commanding the attention of commentators and legislators, the
common law, with its ability to continually adapt to changing circumstances,
has taken the first step toward resolving the problem. The judicial solution
is to award toxic tort victims the cost of the medical testing necessary to
facilitate the early detection of diseases caused by toxic substances. 6 Early
detection enhances the prospects for cure and treatment of toxic-substance-
exposure illnesses, as well as enhancing the victim's chances for a prolonged
life and minimized pain and suffering.7 Permitting recovery of medical
surveillance damages satisfies the tort system's compensation objective by
providing toxic tort victims with a remedy for their injuries.8 Medical
surveillance damages also fulfill the tort system's deterrence function by
compelling toxic substance manufacturers and disposers to internalize the
costs of their actions.
4. See PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 2, § 4, at 20, 25-26; S. SPEISER, C. KRAUSE &
A. GANS, THE AsmRicAN LAW OF TORTS §§ 1.3, 1.32 (1983). See also Seavey, Principles of
Torts, 56 HARv. L. REv. 72, 72 (1942).
5. See, e.g., Faber, Toxic Causation, 71 MnN. L. Rnv. 1219 (1987); Ginsberg & Weiss,
Common Law Liability for Toxic Torts: A Phantom Remedy, 9 HoFSrRA L. REv. 859 (1981);
Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The Hazards of Public Risk Management in the Courts,
85 CoLum. L. REv. 277 (1985); Mihollin, Long-Term Liability for Environmental Harm, 41
U. PITT. L. REv. 1 (1979); Prince, Compensation for Victims of Hazardous Substance Exposure,
11 Wm. MrrcHan L. REv. 657 (1985); Rea, Hazardous Waste Pollution: The Need for a
Different Statutory Approach, 12 ENvTL. L. 443 (1982); Schwartz & Means, The Need for
Federal Product Liability and Toxic Tort Legislation: A Current Assessment, 28 Via. L. Rzv.
1088 (1983); Soble, A Proposal for the Administrative Compensation of Victims of Toxic
Substance Pollution: A Model Act, 14 HARv. J. ON LEGiS. 683 (1977); Trauberman, Statutory
Reform of "Toxic Torts": Relieving Legal, Scientific, and Economic Burdens on the Chemical
Victim, 7 HARv. ENvTL. L. Ra,. 177 (1983); Zazzali & Grad, Hazardous Wastes: New Rights
and Remedies? The Report and Recommendations of the Superfund Study Group, 13 SaroN
HAIL L. RFv. 446 (1983); Note, Personal Injury Hazardous Waste Litigation: A Proposal For
Tort Reform, 10 B.C. E-vmL. Ar'. L. REv. 797 (1983); Comment, Hazardous Waste Liability
and Compensation: Old Solutions, New Solutions, No Solutions, 14 CONN. L. Ray. 307 (1982).
6. See, e.g., Hagerty v. L. & L. Marine Servs., Inc., 788 F.2d 315, reh'g denied, 797
F.2d 256 (5th Cir. 1986); Herber v. Johns-Manville Corp., 785 F.2d 79 (3d Cir. 1986); Friends
for All Children, Inc., v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 746 F.2d 816 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (awarding
medical surveillance damages in a non-toxic tort case); Villari v. Terminix Int'l, Inc., 663 F.
Supp. 727 (E.D. Pa. 1987); Johnson v. Armstrong Cork Co., 645 F. Supp. 764 (W.D. La.
1986); Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 106 N.J. 557, 525 A.2d 287 (1987); Askey v. Occidental
Chem. Corp., 102 A.D.2d 130, 477 N.Y.S.2d 242 (1984).
7. Ayers, 106 N.J. at 591, 525 A.2d at 304.
8. The terms "medical surveillance," "diagnostic testing" and "preventive monitoring"
are used interchangeably by the courts and commentators. They all represent the general
process through which the early detection of latent diseases resulting from toxic exposures is
accomplished. This Note uses the term medical surveillance.
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This Note evaluates the utility of awarding medical surveillance damages
as a method of adequately compensating toxic tort victims. It begins with
an overview of the unique characteristics of toxic torts and the barriers to
recovery encountered by toxic tort victims who have manifested a toxic-
exposure ailment. In light of the barriers to a future recovery, the Note
recommends the recognition of a pre-manifestation cause of action. The
Note then examines the novel pre-manifestation damage theories toxic tort
victims have advanced. After reviewing these other novel damage theories,
the Note examines the legal, medical, and public policy foundations for
medical surveillance damages, and assesses the allowance of medical sur-
veillance damages as a remedy for toxic tort victims. It concludes medical
surveillance damages are a pragmatic and manageable solution to the
dilemma of toxic tort victim compensation. The Note further recommends
expansion of medical surveillance damages to include treatment costs in
addition to detection costs. Finally, the Note delineates the specific elements
courts should require a toxic tort plaintiff to prove in order to recover
medical surveillance damages.
I. THE UNIQUE CHARACTERISTICS OF Toxic TORTS AND THE
OBSTACLES TO Toxic TORT VicTIm COMPENSATION THEY CREATE
A. The Unique Character of Toxic Torts
The genesis of toxic tort victims' recovery difficulties is the common law
tort system's fundamental rules.9 The common law tort system's rules were
developed to address the conflicts raised by simple, straightforward trau-
matic injuries.10 Common law courts did not confront injuries with decade-
long latency periods," or substances causing diseases which raised complex
and uncertain scientific issues.' 2 In a typical tort case, such as an automobile
9. See Note, The Inapplicability of Traditional Tort Analysis to Environmental Risks:
The Example of Toxic Waste Pollution Victim Compensation, 35 STAN. L. REv. 575, 576-78
(1983).
10. Id. at 576-77.
11. Latency period is the interval of time between a person's exposure to the toxic substance
responsible for the manifestation of a disease, and the first signs of the disease by definitive
symptoms or actual detection. See F. HomatargER, J. HAYEs & E. PELKAN, A GUIME TO
GENERAL ToxicoLoav 203 (1983) [hereinafter F. HomuRoER].
12. In addressing the difficulty of applying traditional tort rules in toxic tort cases, one
court aptly summed up the problem when it stated: "It]he simple fact is that rules developed
against the relatively unsophisticated backdrops of barroom brawls, intersection collisions and
slips and falls lose some of their relevance in these days of miracle drugs with their wondrous,
unintended, unanticipated and frequently long-delayed side effects." Martinez-Ferrer v. Ri-
chardson-Merrell, Inc., 105 Cal. App. 3d 316, 324, 164 Cal. Rptr. 591, 595 (1980) (the case




accident, the tort victim's injuries are immediately detectable.' 3 In a toxic
tort case the significant personal injuries often are not detectable simulta-
neously upon exposure to the toxic substance, but rather are latent.14 In
fact, most toxic injuries do not manifest themselves as clinically detectable
ailments until years after exposure occurs."5
Additionally, unlike the injuries suffered in a conventional tort case, the
manner through which toxic substances cause cancer and other maladies is
complex, and to a large extent unknown. 16 While proving how an individual's
leg was broken in an automobile accident is accomplished through simple
medical procedures, establishing the cause of diseases associated with toxic
substances, primarily cancer, is a complicated and difficult process.17 The
scientific uncertainty about cancer etiology presents toxic tort victims with
problems of proving causation that were unknown to, and not provided
for, by the common law in its traditional rules. 18
B. Barriers to Recovery
The unique characteristics of toxic harms have caused toxic tort victims
to encounter a number of almost insurmountable legal and practical barriers
in recovering for their injuries. These barriers do not stem from any
deliberate judicial or legislative decision, but instead arise from the failure
of toxic torts to conform with the common law conception of an injury. 19
13. See Note, Tort Actions for Cancer: Deterrence, Compensation, and Environmental
Carcinogenesis, 90 YALE L.J. 840, 851 (1981). See also Allen v. United States, 588 F. Supp.
247, 405 (D. Utah 1984), rev'd on other grounds, 816 F.2d 1417 (10th Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
108 S. Ct. 694 (1988).
14. Not all toxic tort injuries are latent. There may be some acute effects of exposure.
"Acute effects usually occur shortly after high-level exposure and range in severity from
temporary rashes to death." Trauberman, supra note 5, at 180. An extreme example of serious
acute effects was the Bhopal, India disaster. In the Bhopal accident, a Union Carbide plant
released methyl isocyanate which injured more than 200,000 people and killed over 2,000.
N.Y. Times, Jan. 30, 1985, at 6, col. 2. In many toxic tort cases, however, the significant
personal injuries are latent. For example, exposure to asbestos, even in large amounts, does
not ordinarily cause any contemporaneous injury. The exposure may, however, cause asbestosis
or cancer to manifest years later. See Special Project, An Analysis of the Legal, Social, and
Political Issues Raised by Asbestos Litigation, 36 VAN. L. R-v. 573, 579 (1983) [hereinafter
Special Project]. See generally B. CAsTLE N, ASBESTOS: MEDICAL AND LEGAL ASPECTS 37-103
(1984) (discussing the cancer threat posed by asbestos).
15. For example, the average latency period for hazardous substances causing occupational
cancers are: arsenic, 25 years; tar, 20-24 years; radiation, 20-30 years; asbestos, 18 years;
chromates, 15 years. 5B LAwvaas' MEDICAL CYCLOPEDIA OF PERSONAL INwjuRs AND ALLIED
SPEcIALTIEs § 38.46h (3d ed. 1986) [hereinafter LAwYERs' MEDICAL CYCLOPEDIA].
16. See Note, supra note 13, at 851. See also Trauberman, supra note 5, at 198-99.
17. See Note, supra note 13, at 847-5 1; Trauberman, supra note 5, at 197-201; Developments
in the Law-Toxic Waste Litigation, 99 HAgv. L. Ray. 1458, 1617-24 (1986) [hereinafter
Developments in the Law]. See also Allen, 588 F. Supp. at 404-06.
18. See Developments in the Law, supra note 17, at 1618-20.
19. Note, supra note 9, at 580.
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A brief examination of some of these barriers is essential to appreciating
the necessity of recognizing a pre-manifestation cause of action.20 The
unlikelihood of a toxic tort victim's recovering in a future action enhances
the need to recognize a pre-manifestation action.
In tort cases the plaintiff has the burden of proving the causal nexus
between the defendant's actions or omissions and the damage the plaintiff
has suffered. 2' Proving causation is often the toxic tort plaintiff's most
formidable task.2" Scientific uncertainty about the etiology of cancer and
other latent toxic-exposure maladies makes it virtually impossible for a toxic
tort plaintiff to establish a cause-in-fact, or a substantial relationship be-
tween her injury and her exposure to a particular toxic substance. 3 The
plaintiff cannot establish this nexus because a gap exists between the
probabilistic evidence available to prove medical causation and the partic-
ularistic proof of causation demanded by tort law.2 The uncertain etiology
of toxic-substance-exposure diseases limits scientific testimony to statistical
relationships correlating disease incidence and exposure to suspected carcin-
ogens,1 In most cases, an expert is unable to testify that the plaintiff's
20. For articles giving more extensive analysis of these and other barriers, see Ginsberg &
Weiss, supra note 5, at 874-928 (discussing compensation barrier encountered by Love Canal
plaintiffs); Rosenberg, supra note 1, at 861-905 (discussing recovery barriers in mass toxic tort
cases); Developments in the Law, supra note 17, at 1602-31 (discussing these barriers in the
context of hazardous waste litigation); Special Project, supra note 14, at 582-626, 646-59
(discussing the barriers encountered by asbestos plaintiffs). See also SUPERUND STUDY GROUP,
supra note 2, at 43-132; CoNoRzssIoNA RESEARCH SERv., LiBRARY OF CoNGRESS, 96TH CONG.,
2D SESS., Six CASE STUDIES OF COmPENsATION FOR ToxIc SUBSTANCE POILUTION: ALABAMA,
CALIFORNIA, MIcmOAN, MISSOURI, NEw JERSEY, AND TExAs, REPORT TO THE SENATE COMM.
ON ENVIRoNMENT AND PUBLC Woans 475-98 (Comm. Print 1980) [hereinafter Six CASE
STUDIES]; Trauberman, supra note 5 at 184-206; Note, supra note 5, at 809-33; Comment,
supra note 5, at 317-25.
21. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 2, § 41, at 263.
22. 1 M. SEARCY, A GUIDE TO Toxic TORTS § 10.01, at 10-3 (1987). Some commentators
contend that proving causation is so burdensome it leads many potential plaintiffs to abandon
the option of litigation and rely on other compensation alternatives such as medical insurance,
workers compensation or social security. See Rudlin, Burdens of Proof, in Toxic TORTS:
LmGATrON OF HAZARD OUS SUBSTANCE CASES 449, 450 (G. Nothstein ed. 1984). See also 1 M.
SEARCY, supra, § 10.02 (listing eight causation problems encountered by toxic tort plaintiffs).
23. See Note, supra note 13, at 853-55. See also Rosenberg, supra note 1, at 855-56;
Trauberman, supra note 5, at 198-99.
24. Developments in the Law, supra note 17, at 1619-20. See also 1 M. SEARCY, supra
note 22, § 10.01[2][b] (comparing legal and scientific standards of causation); Note, supra note
5, at 815-16 (listing six requirements for establishing medical causation which rely on the
probability or likelihood of disease development). See generally Dannen & Sagall, Medicolegal
Causation: A Source of Professional Misunderstanding, 3 Am. J.L. & MED. 303 (1977).
25. Trauberman, supra note 5, at 198; Note, supra note 13, at 848; McElveen & Eddy,
Cancer and Toxic Substances: The Problem of Causation and the Use of Epidemiology, 33
CLv. ST. L. REV. 29, 39-40 (1984). A carcinogen is "[a] substance capable of producing a
cancer. It is frequently specific in its action, e.g., it may cause a cancer to develop in rats but
not in man. It is generally used to refer to agents producing all kinds of malignant tumors,
carcinomas, sarcomas, and leukemias." 5B LAWYERS' MEDICAL CYCLOPEDIA, supra note 15,
§ 38.1b, at 266.
1988]
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injuries were more likely than not caused by the defendant.M Thus, the
plaintiff cannot meet her legal burden of proving causation because she
cannot demonstrate a cause-in-fact, or a substantial relationship between
her injuries and the toxic substance.
Due to the long latency period of toxic substance exposure diseases, even
if a toxic tort plaintiff can overcome the difficulties in proving causation,
a statutory time limitation may still bar her recovery.27 There are two types
of statutory time limitations: statutes of limitation and statutes of repose.
Statutes of limitation prescribe the time period in which a lawsuit must be
filed after the cause of action has accrued.n Statutes of repose run inde-
pendent of any manifestation of injury and place an absolute time limit
during which the plaintiff may bring an action. 29
To prevent the inequities of a literal application of statutes of limitation,
a majority of jurisdictions apply a discovery rule.3 0 The discovery rule holds
"a cause of action accrues when the plaintiff knows or through the exercise
of due diligence should know of the injury."131 In a jurisdiction which
applies a discovery rule, a toxic tort plaintiff's action is less likely to be
statutorily precluded. Statutes of limitation, however, remain a substantial
barrier to recovery in those states which do not follow the discovery rule. 2
26. Note, supra note 13, at 854-55. A plaintiffs expert witness may be able to testify that
exposure to a particular amount of substance X is capable of causing an increased amount of
cancer in the exposed population. The expert witness, however, can rarely testify that the
individual plaintiff's disease was caused by the defendant's toxic substance. Trauberman, supra
note 5, at 200.
27. For those individuals exposed to "any hazardous substance, or pollutant or contami-
nant, released into the environment from a facility" Congress has pre-empted state statutes of
limitations and has enacted a discovery rule. 42 U.S.C. § 9658 (Supp. 1987). This federal
legislation relieves the statute of limitation obstacle only for those individuals exposed to toxic
substances through hazardous waste dumps. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (1983) (defining facility as
not including consumer products in consumer use). Therefore, statutes of limitation remain a
substantial obstacle for those exposed to toxic substances other than hazardous waste.
28. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 33-1-1.5-5 (West 1983) (requiring products liability actions
to be brought within two years of the accrual of the cause of action); N.Y. CIV. PRAc. L. &
R. 214(5) (McKinney Supp. 1988) (limiting actions to recover damages for personal injury to
three years).
29. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 33-1-1.5-5 (West 1983) (requiring lawsuits to be brought
within ten years after delivery of the product to the initial user or consumer); OR. Rv. STAT.
§ 12.115(1) (1985) (barring "any action for negligent injury to person or property of another
commenced more than 10 years from the date of the act or omission complained of").
30. At least thirty-nine states have adopted a "discovery rule" in some form. SupEasuND
STUDY GRoUP, supra note 2, at 43, 133-34 n.4. See also Developments in the Law, supra note
17, at 1606 n.20; McGovern, The Status of Statutes of Limitations and Statutes of Repose in
Product Liability Actions: Present and Future, 16 FoRum 416, 438-48 (1981) (charting each
state's position on the discovery rule).
31. Borel v. Fibreboard, 493 F.2d 1076, 1102 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869
(1974). See Note, The Fairness and Constitutionality of Statutes of Limitations for Toxic Tort
Suits, 96 HAgv. L. R-v. 1683, 1684-86 (1983) (discussing the application of statutes of
limitation in toxic tort cases in light of the statutes' purposes).
32. Primarily three other accrual times are used, time of exposure, medical evidence rule
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Even in jurisdictions applying a discovery rule, a statute of limitation may
expire before the plaintiff identifies the causal link between the toxic
substance and her injury.33
If a jurisdiction's statute of limitations does not preclude a toxic tort
plaintiff's claim, the state's repose statute may still bar the claim.34 While
the event triggering the running of repose statutes varies from jurisdiction
to jurisdiction, 35 most toxic-substance diseases do not manifest themselves
within the statutorily allowed time period.36 Thus, in any jurisdiction having
an applicable repose statute, a toxic tort victim will probably be unable to
recover in a lawsuit brought upon manifestation of a latent toxic substance
disease. 37
In addition to these barriers, a toxic tort victim may encounter practical
obstacles to recovery. First, she must be able to locate a defendant who is
not insolvent or defunct by the time the latent disease manifests itself and
litigation commences. 3 Even if the toxic tort plaintiff can locate a viable
defendant, because of the large potential liability it is possible the defendant
will not have the financial wherewithal, or insurance coverage, to pay the
toxic victim's damages.39 Due to the complexity of toxic tort cases, another
significant barrier is the cost of litigation. 40 The plaintiff must bear the
and last employment related exposure. See SuFERFUND STUDY GRouP, supra note 2, at 29-30
& 134 n.10; McGovern, supra note 30, at 422. See also Special Project, supra note 14, at 641-
51.
33. Note, supra note 9, at 581. Due to this possibility some jurisdictions have adopted a
rule which starts the running of the statute of limitation only when the injured party realizes
the causal connection. See Sus'nsuND STUDY GROUP, supra note 2, at 43-44; Developments
in the Law, supra note 17, at 1606-07.
34. Statutes of repose may place additional time restrictions upon the institution of lawsuits
by beginning to run at a different time than statute of limitations, or by placing an outer
limit on a discovery rule statute of limitations. McGovern, supra note 30, at 419-20. Over
forty states have enacted repose statutes. McGovern, The Variety, Policy and Constitutionality
of Product Liability Statutes of Repose, 30 AM. U. L. Rnv. 579, 587-88 (1981). The majority
of repose statutes bar actions not brought within ten years of a triggering event. See, e.g.,
statutes cited supra note 29.
35. See McGovern, supra note 30, at 425 (listing the various triggering events).
36. See supra note 15.
37. See Special Project, supra note 14, at 656; McGovern, supra note 30, at 425.
38. Note, supra note 9, at 584. For example, with regard to toxic waste dumps, site owners
and operators frequently are judgment proof before any litigation is filed. See Ginsberg &
Weiss, supra note 5, at 926-27.
39. Ginsberg & Weiss, supra note 5, at 926. If the toxic substance manufacturer or disposer
is a small enterprise or if there are a large number of plaintiffs, the damage claims may exceed
the assets of the defendant and force it into bankruptcy. By entering into bankruptcy, the
defendant may preclude the plaintiff's full recovery on current claims and any recovery on
future claims. See Roe, Bankruptcy and Mass Tort, 84 CoLum. L. Rnv. 846 (1984); Note, The
Manville Bankruptcy: Treating Mass Tort Claims in Chapter 11 Proceedings, 96 HAxv. L.
Rav. 1121 (1983); Note, Toxic Torts and Chapter 11 Reorganization: The Problem of Future
Claims, 38 VArD. L. Rav. 1369 (1985).
40. SuPERFTrND STUDY GROUP, supra note 2, at 67-68; Ginsberg & Weiss, supra note 5, at
924-25; Note, supra note 9, at 586. Contingent fee arrangements do not solve the cost dilemma
because they merely shift the burden of the risk-benefit calculation to the attorney. Six CAsE
Snmxas, supra note 20, at 495.
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enormous cost of providing both the scientific testing and expert testimony
necessary to prove her case. 41 Although the class action procedure offers a
method to reduce these costs, courts are reluctant to certify class actions in
toxic tort cases. 42 If class certification is not granted, the cost of litigation
may be so overwhelming as to prevent recovery by plaintiffs with substantial
claims, and will surely discourage litigation by plaintiffs with relatively
smaller claims. 43
C. The Consequences of the Barriers
to Toxic Tort Victim Compensation
Theoretically, when toxic tort victims manifest a latent ailment they
possess a remedy for their injuries. Nevertheless, the difficulty in overcoming
the legal and practical barriers to recovery makes it unlikely that an innocent
individual injured by exposure to a toxic substance will recover from the
tortfeasor. The uncertainty of recovery produces several significant conse-
quences. It discourages toxic tort victims from pursuing legal action, 44 and
it encourages the victims who do litigate to settle for inadequate amounts.4 5
The uncertainty of recovery also undermines the tort system's deterrence
objective. 46 At present, toxic substance manufacturers and disposers realize
that traditional tort law bars, or at least discourages, most lawsuits. 47 Thus,
since it is unlikely that they will be subject to liability, they have no
41. See Comment, "Close Encounters of the Toxic Kind"--Toward an Amelioration of
Substantive and Procedural Barriers for Latent Toxic Injury Plaintiffs, 54 Tnma. L.Q. 822,
853 (1983) (concluding it is so expensive to prove proximate cause in toxic tort cases that only
government entities can afford to do so). See also Six CASE STUDIES, supra note 20, at 494-
96; Note, Allocating the Costs of Hazardous Waste Disposal, 94 Hxv. L. Rxv. 584, 591-93
(1981).
42. See, e.g., In re Northern Dist. of Cal. Dalkon Shield IUD Prod. Liab. Litig., 693
F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1171 (1983); In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab.
Litig., 635 F.2d 987, 995 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1128 (1981); McElhaney v. Eli
Lilly & Co., 93 F.R.D. 875 (D. S.D. 1982). But see In re Three Mile Island Litig., 87 F.R.D.
433 (M.D. Pa. 1980). Certification is difficult because injuries resulting from toxic substances
ordinarily manifest themselves at varying times and with varying degrees of severity in the
potential class members. Therefore, questions of law or fact common to the members of the
class rarely predominate over questions affecting only individual class members. See FED. R.
Civ. P. 23(b)(3). See also Note, supra note 41, at 592.
43. SUPERtUND STnUy GRoUP, supra note 2, at 131.
44. Toxic tort victims fail to sue because they simply do not wish to become involved in
burdensome litigation when they believe their injuries are trivial or will be compensated in
other ways, i.e., insurance, worker's compensation and social security. Six CAsE S=trDms,
supra note 20, at 494-97.
45. Six CASE STupms, supra note 20, at 494-95. "Although settlement per se is not
undesirable, a settlement between a typical personal plaintiff and a corporate defendant may
disproportionately reflect the relative bargaining resources of the parties rather than the merits
of the plaintiff's claim." Note, supra note 9, at 586.
46. Developments in the Law, supra note 17, at 1630.
47. Id.
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economic incentive to prevent or control exposure to toxic substances.4 8
The barriers to compensation encountered by toxic tort victims, and the
inadequate deterrence of the hazardous activities of toxic substance manu-
facturers and disposers, present our society with serious legal and public
policy problems. Most commentators who have examined the problem
contend that common law doctrines and the judicial system are ill-suited to
solve the problems raised by latent toxic injuries. 49 They believe the only
appropriate resolution is a statutory response. 50 While these commentators
may be correct, calls for legislative action have fallen upon deaf ears.51
Therefore, whether or not the courts are the appropriate institution, the
legislative inaction has left the resolution of the problem of toxic tort
victim's compensation to the judicial system.
Recognizing the judicial system will have to resolve the problem of toxic
tort victim compensation requires the adoption of a different perspective as
to possible solutions. The courts, unlike legislatures, ordinarily alter tort
law incrementally, and only adjudicate the rights of the parties before
them.5 2 Many of the solutions proposed by commentators are therefore
inappropriate as judicial acts.53 Even disregarding these institutional con-
48. Of course, this presupposes the toxic substance manufacturer or disposer feels no moral
or ethical obligation to control the risk of exposure. A frequent reason for imposing liability
upon a defendant is to provide an incentive to the defendant to prevent the reoccurrence of
the harm. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 2, § 4, at 25. The present system provides no
incentive to toxic substance producers to consider the external costs of their actions. See
Developments in the Law, supra note 17, at 1630. While the mere existence of external costs
does not justify the imposition of liability upon toxic substance producers, the toxic substance
producers and disposers are the parties best able to prevent the harm at the lowest cost. See
R. POSNER, ECONOMiC ANALYsIs OF LAw 62 (3d ed. 1986); Developments in the Law, supra
note 17, at 1630 & n.150; Trauberman, supra note 5, at 206-15.
49. See commentators cited supra note 5. See also Suxr'ruND STUDY GROUP, supra note
2, at 130-32; Six CASE STrums, supra note 20, at 520-21; Developments in the Law, supra
note 17, at 1630-31; Note, supra note 9, at 587.
50. See commentators cited supra note 5. See also SUPERFUND STUDY GROUP, supra note
2, at 193-271; Developments in the Law, supra note 17, at 1630-31; Note, supra note 9, at
612-16.
51. See Comment, supra note 41, at 833 (private remedies for the victims of toxic waste
are conspicuously absent from federal environmental statutes). Only four states, Alaska, North
Carolina, North Dakota, and Rhode Island have enacted statutory private remedies. See
SuPERFOND STUDY GROUP, supra note 2, at 75, 141 n.96. See also Grad, Injuries From
Exposure to Hazardous Waste: Can the Victim Recover?, 2 J. PROD. L. 133, 136 (1983)
(finding that state remedies for toxic substance exposure are virtually nonexistent). In enacting
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (Superfund),
Congress included no provision for compensation of personal injuries. See Zazzali & Grad,
supra note 5, at 446. Instead, Congress created a study group to address the problem. Id. at
447. Congress, however, has not adopted the Study Group's recommendations. See Ayers v.
Township of Jackson, 106 N.J. 557, 581, 525 A.2d 287, 299 n.5 (1987).
52. See PROSSER ANcD KEETokr, supra note 2, § 3, at 17-20. See also Keeton, Creative
Continuity in the Law of Torts, 75 HAv. L. R-v. 463, 463-72 (discussing the creativity and
continuity in judicial reform of tort law).
53. For example, the establishment of a general toxic tort victim's compensation fund
financed by industry and government cannot be implemented by the courts. See Trauberman,
supra note 5, at 250. Such a broad ruling is simply beyond the judiciary's power.
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straints, some proposals for victim compensation are troublesome because
of their undesirable consequences. Some proposed resolutions require sweep-
ing changes in the tort system which would have a detrimental impact on
new product development, and create serious insurance industry implica-
tions.5 4 The appropriate solution must balance the need to compensate the
innocent victims of toxic torts, with society's interest in benefiting from
technological advancement.5 5 Achievement of the judicial solution will occur
through a gradual process of doctrinal evolution with the goal of modifying
the tort system's current rules to provide for the compensation of toxic tort
victims. 6 Courts are currently considering the possibility of a pre-manifes-
tation recovery for the unique injuries caused by toxic substances. The next
section addresses these novel damage theories.
II. Toxic TORT DAMAGE TloRms
As a general proposition, the damages recoverable for personal injuries
are well established. Such certainty, however, does not extend to toxic
injuries. Although the traditional concepts of pain and suffering, lost wages
and the like apply in toxic tort cases, the special circumstances and novel
injuries produced by toxic substances have prompted courts to consider
recognizing innovative remedies. Medical surveillance damages are one of
the innovative remedies being contemplated. Before examining medical
surveillance damages, an overview of some of the other innovative damage
theories is presented. 7 The new damage theories presented most often by
54. See Corash, Evaluating the Effects of Alternative Compensation Systems, 14 Envtl. L.
Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,121 (Mar. 1984); Cheek, Why Current Victim Compensation Proposals
Are Unfair and Ineffective, 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,124 (Mar. 1984). Furthermore,
many proposals disregard "the delicate balance in tort law between objectives and rules for
recovery.... Traditional objectives may not be furthered by indiscriminately allowing recovery
in [the] unique context [of toxic torts]." Note, supra note 9, at 587.
55. Many of the conveniences and medical advances of today's society are a result of
technological innovation. A solution to toxic tort victim compensation must not create a dis-
incentive for continued technological innovation. See Corash, supra note 54, at 10,122-23;
Cheek, supra note 54, at 10,124.
56. The prototypical example of an extension of common law rules to address the problems
raised by toxic torts is the California Supreme Court's decision in Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 26
Cal. 3d 588, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980). Contrary to other
commentators, this author believes the judicial system can resolve the problem if it is given
time. While during this period many toxic tort victims may go uncompensated, it is not the
fault of the judicial system but rather federal and state legislatures. Legislatures are the
institution designed to respond quickly, not the courts.
57. For a more extensive discussion of these other damage theories, particularly fear of
disease and increased risk of disease, see M. Dom, supra note 2, at Ch. 6; G. WmrTnxA &
R. PoNEssA,"Emerging Damage Theories in Toxic Tort Litigation, in PREPARATION AND TALm
OF A CoMnnx ToxIc CEMICAL OR HAzARDOUS WAsTE CAsE 1986 351-69 (S. Birnbaum & M.
Pope eds. 1986) [hereinafter CoMPLnx Toxic CHEMIcAL CAsE]; Dworkin, Fear of Disease and
Delayed Manifestation Injuries: A Solution or a Pandora's Box?, 53 FoRDHAad L. REv. 527
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toxic tort plaintiffs are claims for the emotional harm suffered because of
the fear of developing a toxic exposure disease, and the increased risk of
developing a latent, toxic exposure disease. Other, less commonly asserted
damage theories, such as impaired quality-of-life and loss-of-chance, are
also examined.
A. Fear and Increased Risk of Future Disease Damages
The primary legal barrier encountered by toxic 'tort plaintiffs prior to
manifestation of a latent disease is proving the existence of a compensable
harm. Courts have generally refused to recognize mere exposure to a toxic
substance as an injury unless the exposure victim manifests a detectable
physical injury. 8 Under common law principles, the mere possibility of a
future harm is an insufficient basis for a present recovery. 9 "This require-
ment is premised in the principle of tort law that the plaintiff must establish
an injury that is not speculative in order to recover damages." 60 In an
attempt to circumvent the injury requirement, toxic tort plaintiffs have
characterized their injuries either as mental anguish from the fear of
manifesting a future disease, 6' or the increased risk of developing a latent
disease. 62 While some plaintiffs have succeeded in convincing a few courts
to recognize fear-of-disease claims, 63 courts have uniformly rejected the
increased risk claims. 64
(1984); Faulkner & Woods, Fear of Future Disability-An Element of Damages in a Personal
Injury Action, 7 W. NEw ENG. L. REv. 865 (1985); Gale & Goyer, Recovery for Cancerphobia
and Increased Risk of Cancer, 15 Cumra. L. REv. 723 (1985); Note, Increased Risk of Cancer
as an Actionable Injury, 18 GA. L. Rnv. 563 (1984); Note, Increased Risk of Disease From
Hazardous Waste: A Proposal for Judicial Relief, 60 WASH. L. REv. 635 (1985) [hereinafter
Increased Risk of Disease]; Comment, Emotional Distress Damages for Cancerphobia: A Case
for the DES Daughter, 14 PAc. L.J. 1215 (1983). See also Annotation, Future Disease or
Condition, or Anxiety Relating Thereto, as Element of Recovery, 50 A.L.R.4th 13 (1986).
58. See, e.g., Eagle-Picher Indus. v. Cox, 481 So. 2d 517, 528 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985),
review denied, 492 So. 2d 1331 (Fla. 1986); Payton v. Abbott Labs., 386 Mass. 540, 545, 437
N.E.2d 171, 174 (1982);. For a good review of the recent cases discussing the present injury
requirement, see ComLax Toxic CnmacAL CASE, supra note 57, at 354-69.
59. PROSSER AND KmaTON, supra note 2, § 30, at 165.
60. Brafford v. Susquehanna Corp., 586 F. Supp. 14, 17 (D. Colo. 1984).
61. See, e.g., Anderson v. W.R. Grace & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1219 (D. Mass. 1986); Payton,
386 Mass. at 540, 437 N.E.2d at 171; Laxton v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 639 S.W.2d 431
(Tenn. 1982)..
62. See, e.g., Dartez v. Fibreboard Corp., 765 F.2d 456 (5th Cir. 1985); Brafford, 586 F.
Supp. at 14; Plummer v. Abbott Labs., 568 F. Supp. 920, 921 (D. R.I. 1983).
63. See, e.g., Wetherhill v. University of Chicago, 565 F. Supp. 1553 (N.D. Ill. 1983);
Laxton, 639 S.W.2d at 431.
64. See, e.g., Anderson, 628 F. Supp. at 1219; Plummer, 568 F. Supp. at 920. One of the
best reasoned opinions discussing fear and increased risk of disease claims is an unpublished
decision, Arnett v. Dow Chem. Co., S.F. Master File No. 729586, reprinted in COMPLEX Toxic
CHEWCAL CASE, supra note 57, at 377.
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Although it is acknowledged that an increased risk of disease exists upon
exposure to a toxic substance, 65 this increased risk corresponds to a general
population exposed to the toxic substance and often cannot be particularized
to the individual plaintiff.6 Thus, the toxic tort plaintiff ordinarily cannot
prove with reasonable medical certainty that she will eventually manifest
cancer or some other exposure related disease.6 7 Without proof that it is
reasonably certain the plaintiff will manifest a latent disease, courts have
refused to allow juries to speculate about what may happen in the future. 8
Courts have instead advised plaintiffs to bring an action when a disease
manifests itself.6 9 Only in those cases in which plaintiffs have met the
jurisdiction's burden of proof as to the future consequences of an injury
have plaintiffs recovered for an increased risk of disease.70
Actions for fear of disease have met with greater judicial acceptance.
This acceptance is based on common law emotional distress theory, and a
judicial willingness to allow recovery for fear of a future harm.7' Neverthe-
less, a toxic tort plaintiff's chances for recovery remain scant. Most juris-
dictions require a physical injury or disease as a prerequisite to recovery
for emotional distress damages.7 2 In toxic tort cases where the plaintiff has
not manifested an exposure related ailment, or suffered physical harm as a
result of emotional distress, the lack of a physical injury has prevented
recovery.73 Even where the plaintiff can satisfy the physical injury require-
65. See Hagerty v. L. & L. Marine Servs., Inc., 788 F.2d 315, 319, reh'g denied, 797 F.2d
256 (5th Cir. 1986); Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 647 F. Supp. 303, 321-22 (W.D. Tenn.
1986). See also Increased Risk of Disease, supra note 57, at 636.
66. For example, studies may uncontrovertibly establish that 20 out of every 100 persons
exposed to a certain quantity of chemical X will develop cancer. Using this statistic, a plaintiff
exposed to chemical X can establish that he has a 20% increased chance of developing cancer.
The courts have refused to compensate for this increased chance because the plaintiff cannot
show that he is one of the 20 individuals who will develop cancer because of his exposure to
chemical X. See Note, supra note 9, at 582.
67. See, e.g., Anderson, 628 F. Supp. at 1219; Plummer, 568 F. Supp. at 920. See also
Annotation, Admissibility of Expert Medical Testimony as to Future Consequences of Injury
as Affected by Expression in Terms of Probability or Possibility, 75 A.L.R.3d 9 (1977).
68. See Anderson, 628 F. Supp. at 1219; Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 106 N.J. 575,
577, 525 A.2d 287, 297 (1987).
69. See, e.g., Delvin v. Johns-Manville Corp., 202 N.J. Super. 556, 569, 495 A.2d 495,
502 (1985); Eagle-Picher, 481 So. 2d at 520.
70. See, e.g., Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 727 F.2d 506 (5th Cir. 1984), on
reh'g en banc, 750 F.2d 1314 (5th Cir. 1985), questions certified en banc, 757 F.2d 614 (5th
Cir. 1985), certification declined, 469 So. 2d 99 (Miss. 1985), on reh'g en banc, 781 F.2d 394
(5th Cir. 1986); Gideon v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 761 F.2d 1129 (5th Cir. 1985).
71. Gale & Goyer, supra note 57, at 729-30. See also PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 2,
§ 30, at 168; Faulkner & Woods, supra note 57, at 872-77.
72. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 2, § 54, at 361. Traditionally, claims for emotional
distress have been disfavored because they are easily simulated and abused. Accordingly, courts
have required either an impact or a physical injury as a guarantee of reliability. See Dworkin,
supra note 57, at 528-36; PROSSER AND KEErON, supra note 2, § 54, at 359-66.
73. See, e.g., Plummer, 568 F. Supp. at 925; Mink v. University of Chicago, 460 F. Supp.
713, 719 (N.D. Ill. 1978); Payton, 386 Mass. at 548, 437 N.E.2d at 176.
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ment, she has the difficult task of persuading the jury to compensate her
for her anxiety. The prevalent nature of toxic substances and the risk of
cancer inherent in every person's life makes it difficult to convince a jury
to compensate a plaintiff for her fear.74 Jury verdicts in fear of cancer
cases illustrate this difficulty."
B. Other Novel Damage Theories
Toxic tort incidents often cause significant disruptions in the everyday
life of individuals. 76 In general, life after the incident may be dramatically
less enjoyable than it was before. Consequently, plaintiffs using nuisance
theory have sought to recover damages for the inconvenience, aggravation,
unnecessary expenditure of time and effort-in essence, a decreased quality
of life-resulting from the toxic incident.77 Courts have been generally
receptive to these claims .7 Decreased quality-of-life damages, however, are
available only to toxic tort victims injured as a result of a nuisance.79
Toxic tort plaintiffs have also attempted to recover under the lost chance
doctrine. s0 Under this doctrine "a plaintiff can recover for damages suffered
as the result of nonfeasance that reduced the possibility of avoiding an
injury actually sustained." 8' A few courts have recognized the lost chance
theory in cases involving a physician's delay in diagnosing a patient's disease,
thereby decreasing the patient's chance of survival or recovery.8 2 The courts,
however, have declined to apply the doctrine to toxic tort injuries.83
74. See Herber v. Johns-Manville Corp., 785 F.2d 79, 88-89 (3d Cir. 1986); Dworkin,
supra note 57, at 576.
75. See Herber, 785 F.2d at 88-89 (the jury found the defendant negligent but it nevertheless
awarded the plaintiffs "zero" dollars as damages for their emotional distress due to fear of
cancer).
76. For example, drinking water supplies may be contaminated requiring bottled water be
used for drinking, cooking, washing and bathing. See, e.g., Ayers, 106 N.J. at 569-70, 525
A.2d at 293.
77. Id. See also Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 647 F. Supp. 303, 321 (W.D. Tenn.
1986).
78. See Ayers, 106 N.J. at 570-72, 525 A.2d at 293-94; Sterling, 647 F. Supp. at 321. But
see ComPLEx Toxic CnMacAL CASE, supra note 57, at 375-76 (citing Westron v. Kerr-Mcgee
Corp., an unreported U.S. District Court case in the eastern district of Illinois, rejecting
decreased quality-of-life damages).
79. See D. DoBBs, RxmEmid s: DAmAos-EQurr-RtstmoN § 5.3, at 334 (1973).
80. See Herber, 785 F.2d at 82-83.
81. Id. at 82. See also Branch, Misdiagnosis of Cancer and Loss of Chance, 30 AM. Jun.
TRALs 237 (1983); Wolfstone & Wolfstone, Recovery of Damages for the Loss of Chance, 28
MED. TRAL TEc. Q. 121 (1981); Comment, Playing the Percentages: A Re-examination of
Recovery for Loss of Chance, 26 SANTA CLA L. REv. 429 (1986).
82. See Jones v. Montefiore Hosp., 494 Pa. 410, 431 A.2d 920 (1981); Gradel v. Inouye,
491 Pa. 534, 421 A.2d 674 (1980); Herskovits v. Group Health Coop. of Puget Sound, 99
Wash. 2d 609, 664 P.2d 474 (1983). Compare Cooper v. Sisters of Charity, 27 Ohio St. 2d
242, 272 N.E.2d 97 (1971); Hiser v. Randolph, 126 Ariz. 608, 617 P.2d 774 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1980).
83. See Herber, 785 F.2d at 82-83.
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C. The Problem of Claim Preclusion
A concern universal to all pre-manifestation damage theories is whether
the doctrine of claim preclusion bars any future action if a latent disease
manifests itself. That is, if a toxic tort plaintiff brings a pre-manifestation
action to recover, for example, medical surveillance damages, will claim
preclusion bar any future litigation if a latent disease manifests itself?. Most
courts addressing this issue have held that pre-manifestation actions would
not preclude a latter action if a latent disease manifests.85 A few jurisdictions,
however, have strictly applied the prohibition against claim splitting and
denied toxic tort victims a recovery in a second action for damages for
latent manifested injuries.16 In jurisdictions strictly applying the prohibition
against claim splitting toxic tort victims must carefully evaluate whether a
pre-manifestation or post-manifestation action is their most viable alterna-
tive.
III. THm LEGAL, MEDICAL AND PUBLIC POLICY JUSTIFICATIONS FOR
MEDICAL SURVEILLANCE DAMAGES
Prior to manifestation of a latent disease, the courts should recognize
toxic tort victims' rights to recover the expenses incurred in monitoring
their health for the development of exposure related ailments. Recently,
some courts have recognized medical surveillance expenses as an independent
element of damages. 7 The recognition of medical surveillance damages is
predicated upon an extension of common law damage doctrines, medical
knowledge, and public policy considerations.
84. Under the transactional definition of causes of action, a plaintiff has only one cause
of action for all present and future injuries caused by a single tort regardless of the various
harms which result. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 25 comment c (1982). A plaintiff
is not permitted to split her cause of action and seek damages for some injuries in one lawsuit
and later-manifesting injuries in another lawsuit. See F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, Crvi PROCEDURE
§ 11.9, at 601-02 (3d ed. 1985).
85. See, e.g., Hagerty, 788 F.2d at 315; Ayers, 106 N.J. at 557, 525 A.2d at 287; Delvin,
202 N.J. Super. at 556, 495 A.2d at 495; Eagle-Picher, 481 So. 2d at 517.
86. See, e.g., Graffagnino v. Fibreboard Corp., 776 F.2d 1307, 1309 (5th Cir. 1985), reh'g
denied, 781 F.2d 1111 (5th Cir. 1986); Carbonaro v. Johns-Manville Corp., 526 F. Supp. 260,
262-64 (E.D. Pa. 1981), aff'd without opinion, 688 F.2d 819 (3d Cir. 1982).
87. See Herber v. Johns-Manville Corp., 785 F.2d 79, 83 (3d Cir. 1986) (stating "New
Jersey recognizes the cost of preventative monitoring occasioned by a tort as an independent
element of damages."); Askey v. Occidental Chem. Corp., 102 A.D.2d 130, 135, 477 N.Y.S.2d
242 (1984) (holding "there is a basis in law to sustain a claim for medical monitoring as an
element of consequential damage"). See also Hagerty v. L. & L. Marine Servs., Inc., 788
F.2d 315, reh'g denied, 797 F.2d 256 (5th Cir. 1986); Friends for All Children, Inc. v. Lockheed
Aircraft Corp., 746 F.2d 816 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Johnson v. Armstrong Cork Co., 645 F. Supp.




Recognizing the right of pre-manifestation toxic tort plaintiffs to recover
the costs of medical surveillance testing from a tortfeasor is a logical
extension of common law doctrine. The principles of two common law
concepts provide the foundation for permitting the recovery of medical
surveillance damages: the allowance of prospective medical expense damages,
and the avoidable consequences rule.88
1. Prospective Medical Expenses
Every court recognizing medical surveillance expenses as an independent
element of damages has relied upon-at least in part-the generally accepted
principle of allowing tort victims to recover future medical expenses.8 9 It is
well established that a tort victim is entitled to recover from the tortfeasor
those medical expenses, resulting from the injury, that are reasonably certain
to be necessarily incurred in the future.9 In awarding medical surveillance
damages courts have slightly altered the reasonable probability standard. 91
The test for the compensability of medical surveillance expenses is whether
future testing is necessary to detect the early warning signs of latent
ailments.92
The modification of the reasonable probability standard reflects the unique
injuries suffered by toxic tort victims. In the typical personal injury case,
88. These rules are mutually exclusive. A court can rely on either one, or both, as the
legal basis for awarding medical surveillance damages.
89. See Ayers, 106 N.J. at 599-606, 525 A.2d at 308-12; Friends, 746 F.2d at 824-27;
Hagerty, 788 F.2d at 319; Herber, 785 F.2d at 83; Askey, 102 A.D.2d at 137, 477 N.Y.S.2d
at 247.
90. See F. HARPER, F. JA s & 0. GRAY, 4 THE LAw oF TORTS, § 25.9, at 557-58 (2d ed.
1986). See also C. McCoRMICK, DAmAGES § 90 (1935); J. STENm, DAmAGEs AND REcovERY:
PERSONAL INJURY AND DEATH AcTIoNs § 95 (1972); Annotation, Requisite Proof to Permit
Recovery for Future Medical Expenses as Item of Damages in Personal Injury Action, 69
A.L.R.2d 1261 (1960).
91. See Note, Future Medical Surveillance: An Award for Toxic Tort Victims, 38 RurrGEs
L. Rav. 795, 802-03 (1986). See also Friends, 746 F.2d at 825-26; Ayers, 106 N.J. at 603-06,
525 A.2d at 311-12.
92. Friends, 746 F.2d at 826; Ayers, 106 N.J. at 603-06, 525 A.2d at 311-12. See also
Note, supra note 91, at 803. The trial court in Ayers explained:
It is not the reasonable probability of whether plaintiffs will suffer cancer in the
future that should determine whether medical surveillance is necessary. Rather,
it is whether it is necessary, based on medical judgment, that a plaintiff who has
been exposed to known carcinogens at various levels should undergo annual
medical testing in order to properly diagnose the warning signs of the development
of the disease. If it is necessary, then the probability of the need for that medical
surveillance is cognizable as part of plaintiff's claim.
189 N.J. Super. 561, 572-73, 461 A.2d 184, 190 (1983), rev'd in part, affid in part, 202 N.J.




the tort victim requesting prospective medical expenses has suffered a
currently manifested physical injury. In a toxic tort case the plaintiff is
attempting to recover the medical expenses necessary to detect an injury
which does not currently exist, nor may ever manifest itself. Because the
courts are unwilling to recognize mere exposure to a toxic substance as an
injury,9 and because in every tort action the plaintiff must prove she has
suffered a compensable harm, 94 toxic tort plaintiffs must prove they have
suffered a legally recognized injury in order to recover medical surveillance
damages.
In medical surveillance actions, the requisite injury is the invasion of an
individual's interest in avoiding medical surveillance examinations. 95 In other
words, because of the tortfeasor's actions the plaintiff must undergo medical
tests which she would not have undergone but for her exposure to the toxic
substance." While this injury is not an actual physical injury, it is no less
an invasion of a legally protected interest justifying compensation. 97 In
Friends for All Children, Inc. v. Lockheed Corp., the court in allowing
medical surveillance damages provided the following persuasive rationale
93. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
94. See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
95. See Friends, 746 F.2d at 826. The Friends case was an action on the behalf of
Vietnamese orphans aboard a plane which crashed allegedly due to Lockheed's faulty design.
The plaintiffs sought a partial summary judgment motion holding Lockheed liable for the cost
of diagnostic examinations to determine if the children were suffering from a neurological
development disease resulting from the crash. Id. at 819-23. While this case did not involve a
toxic substance the legal analysis is still applicable. Compare Villari v. Terminix Int'l, Inc.,
663 F. Supp. 727 (E.D. Pa. 1987). In Villari the court held that Pennsylvania law requires a
plaintiff seeking to recover medical surveillance damages to prove she has suffered a physical
injury. The court, however, found in the plaintiff's suffering of headaches, nausea, dizziness
and general malaise were sufficient physical injuries to award medical surveilance damages.
Id. at 735.
96. See Friends, 746 F.2d at 826; Ayers, 106 N.J. at 601-03, 525 A.2d at 310-11.
97. Friends, 746 F.2d at 826. The Court relied upon the definition of an injury found in
§ 7 of the Second Restatement of Torts. The Restatement defines an injury as "the invasion
of any legally protected interest of another." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 7(1) (1965).
The court also posed the following hypothetical in support of its conclusion:
To aid our analysis of whether tort law should encompass a cause of action for
diagnostic examinations without proof of actual injury, it is useful to step back
... and hypothesize a simple, everyday accident involving two individuals, whom
we shall identify simply as Smith and Jones:
Jones is knocked down by a motorbike which Smith is riding through a red
light. Jones lands on his head with some force. Understandably shaken, Jones
enters a hospital where doctors recommend that he undergo a battery of tests to
determine whether he has suffered any internal injuries. The tests prove negative,
but Jones sues Smith solely for what turns out to be the substantial cost of the
diagnostic examinations.
From our example, it is clear that even in the absence of physical injury Jones
ought to be able to recover the cost for the various diagnostic examinations
proximately caused by Smith's negligent action.
Friends, 746 F.2d at 825.
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for the recognition of medical surveillance claims in the absence of a
manifested physical injury:
It is difficult to dispute that an individual has an interest in avoiding
expensive diagnostic examinations just as he or she has an interest in
avoiding physical injury. When a defendant negligently invades this
interest, the injury to which is neither speculative nor resistant to proof,
it is elementary that the defendant should make the plaintiff whole by
paying for the examinations. 9'
2. Avoidable Consequences Rule
The other legal principle relied upon in allowing medical surveillance
damages is the avoidable consequences rule.99 This rule holds that an
individual "injured by the tort of another is not entitled to recover damages
for any harm that he could have avoided by the use of reasonable effort
or expenditure after the commission of a tort."1°0 As a necessary corollary
to this rule, the tort victim who incurs an expense in attempting to minimize
her damages can recover the expenses incurred. 10' Accordingly, in a toxic
tort case the avoidable consequences rule requires a toxic tort victim to
undergo whatever medical surveillance testing is necessary for the diagnosis
or treatment of an exposure related ailment. °2 A toxic tort plaintiff's failure
to submit to such tests may limit her future recovery for a condition she
could have avoided by undergoing the prescribed tests. Therefore, since
application of the avoidable consequences rule requires the toxic tort victim
to incur the expense of medical surveillance testing, the tortfeasor should
be required to reimburse the plaintiff for the cost of the testing. 103 In
essence, the rule requires the plaintiff to undergo medical surveillance testing
or possibly forgo future damages, and also provides a legal justification for
toxic tort victims to recover surveillance expenses.
While the avoidable consequences rule has not received the same judicial
scrutiny as the prospective damages rule, it provides a justification for the
recovery of medical surveillance damages upon which plaintiffs and courts
98. Friends, 746 F.2d at 826.
99. See Hagerty, 788 F.2d at 315. See also Ayers, 106 N.J. at 601-03, 525 A.2d at 310-11
(quoting extensively from Hagerty). The avoidable consequences rule is often described as the
tort victim's duty to mitigate damages. While this expression is convenient, a tort victim in
fact owes no duty to the person who injures him. C. McCoRM.uCK, supra note 90, § 33, at
128. The correct principle is that a tort victim cannot recover damages which could have been
avoided. Gideon v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 761 F.2d 1129, 1139 (5th Cir. 1985).
100. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) ToRTs § 918(1) (1977). See also C. McCoRMICK, supra note
90, § 33; J. Smm, supra note 90, §§ 124-26.
101. J. STEm, supra note 90, § 128, at 223. See also A. ROECA, Damages in Toxic TORTS,
supra note 22, § 17.03, at 497-98.




should place greater reliance. The only problems with the rule's application
stem from the physical injury requirement, and the problem of requiring
tort victims to undergo burdensome, and possibly dangerous, medical pro-
cedures.
In response to the avoidable consequences rationale for medical surveil-
lance damages, plaintiffs should expect defendants to raise the present injury
issue.'04 Here, defendants will argue that the medical surveillance expenses
incurred by plaintiffs are not recoverable because there is no injury from
which to avoid the consequences. Ordinarily, defendants should lose this
argument. The injuries plaintiffs are attempting to mitigate result from the
manifestation of latent toxic exposure diseases. To mitigate the injuries
resulting from the manifestation of these diseases, the plaintiff should
undergo medical surveillance testing in order to facilitate early detection.
Therefore, the defendant should bear the cost of the plaintiff's medical
testing because the defendant exposed the plaintiff to the toxic substance,
thereby causing the need for testing and early detection.105
The other potential problem with the application of the avoidable con-
sequences rule is its general limitation that a tort victim is not required to
undergo medical treatment which might be painful or dangerous.' °6 Since
medical surveillance testing may involve pain or danger,ec defendants could
argue this exception applies, and therefore damages should not be awarded.
Nevertheless, this argument should normally fail. By seeking to recover
medical surveillance damages, the plaintiffs are conceding their willingness,
in fact their desire, to undergo the testing. The exception for medical
procedures involving pain or danger is designed to prevent tort victims from
being coerced to undergo such procedures. 08 The exception is not designed
to allow defendants to escape liability. Plaintiffs should note, however, that
judicial acceptance of medical surveillance damages in actions for manifested
diseases will necessitate that they prove they underwent the prescribed
medical tests. Otherwise, the defendant can invoke the avoidable conse-
quences rule and have the plaintiff's damages reduced accordingly.
104. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
105. Concededly, while the underlying injury in a medical surveillance case-the increased
risk of disease-is not itself compensable, this does not mean that the testing necessitated by
the increased risk is non-compensable. See Ayers, 106 N.J. at 604-05, 525 A.2d at 312. The
court cited the example of "wrongful birth" as another context where the underlying disease
was not compensable, but medical expenses incurred were compensable. Id. The court also
stated "that the public health interest may justify judicial intervention even when the risk of
disease is problematic." Id.
106. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) oF ToRTs § 918 comment d. (1979) See also C. McCosUucK,
supra note 90, § 36; J. STEiN, supra note 90, §§ 129, 133-35, 137-41.
107. See Ashford, Spadafor & Caldart, Human Monitoring: Scientific, Legal and Ethical
Concerns, 8 HAtv. ENvTL. L. Rnv. 263, 287 (1984) [hereinafter Ashford].
108. See C. McComecK, supra note 90, § 36, at 137. See also RSTATEmENT (SEcom) oF




The legal basis for the recovery of medical surveillance damages is
predicated upon medical surveillance testing's facilitation of the early de-
tection of latent diseases. Toxic tort plaintiffs argue the early detection of
toxic-substance-exposure diseases improves their "prospects for cure, treat-
ment, prolongation of life, and minimization of pain and disability."' 9 To
appreciate the plaintiffs' legal argument, an overview of medical surveill-
ance's function in disease control is essential, as is a review of the benefits
achieved from early detection.110
Medical surveillance testing is part of the secondary prevention of carcin-
ogenic diseases."' Secondary disease prevention encompasses those methods
which seek to detect carcinogenic diseases early enough to undertake an
effective treatment program." 2 Early detection is accomplished through the
periodic testing and screening of individuals exposed to carcinogenic subst-
ances,"1 and through informational programs designed to educate those
exposed to the early warning signs of exposure diseases.114
The vast majority of medical authorities consider the early detection of
carcinogenic exposure diseases to be beneficial in the disease's treatment,
and to the exposure victim's chances of survival." 5 The benefits of early
detection of cancer have been so extensively promoted that the courts
assume early detection is indispensable for the successful treatment of
carcinogenic diseases.1 16 Due to the medical uncertainty about the etiology
109. Ayers, 106 N.J. at 590, 525 A.2d at 304. See also Hagerty, 788 F.2d at 319; Askey,
102 A.D.2d at 137, 477 N.Y.S.2d at 247.
110. This discussion is meant merely as an overview. Any extensive discussion of technical
medical issues is beyond the scope of this note. The primary disease sought to be detected
from exposure to toxic substances is cancer. The focus here, therefore, is on medical surveillance
testing and early detection of cancer.
111. M. ALDERSON, OccurPAioNtA CAucER 182 (1986). See also Ashford, supra note 107,
at 265-67. For the definition of a carcinogen, see supra note 25.
112. M. ALDERSON, supra note 111, at 182. Secondary prevention is one of three methods
of achieving disease control. The other two methods are primary and tertiary prevention.
Primary prevention aims to remove the disease causing substance, tertiary prevention concerns
the alleviation of the problems associated with the disease. Id.
113. See id. In Ayers, the plaintiff's expert described the screening process as being a two-
stage procedure. Ayers, 106 N.J. at 599 n.12, 525 A.2d at 309 n.12. The first stage occurs
one to three years after exposure. At that time the toxic tort victim undergoes medical
surveillance testing for the purpose of establishing baseline data. The second stage of medical
surveillance testing is commenced at the onset of the risk of disease and continued annually
thereafter. Id. In Ayers, it was estimated that the second stage of testing would begin ten
years after exposure. Id.
114. M. ALDESON, supra note 111, at 182.
115. See Evers v. Dollinger, 95 N.J. 399, 424 & n.2, 471 A.2d 405, 419 & n.2 (1984)
(Handier, J., concurring). "Common to most cancers is the need for early diagnosis which in
some cases greatly increases the chances of cure by conventional methods of surgery and
radiation." F. HomnuxmaR, supra note 11, at 201.
116. See Ayers, 106 N.J. at 603.04, 525 A.2d at 311; Evers, 95 N.J. at 426-27 & nn.3-5,
471 A.2d at 419-20 & nn.3-5.
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of cancer, however, some medical authorities believe early detection does
not necessarily improve the treatment, 117 or survival chances, of a patient."'
These authorities argue "early diagnosis merely lengthens the time over
which a person knows he suffers from the disease, but does nothing to alter
the natural history of the condition, or the ultimate fatality."" 9
Due to divergent medical views concerning the benefits of early detection,
defendants in a lawsuit in which the plaintiff requests medical surveillance
damages should consider contesting the value of early detection, and thereby
the need for awarding medical surveillance damages. Nevertheless, unless
medical research unequivocally demonstrates that early detection of carcin-
ogenic diseases is ineffective in their treatment, courts will probably continue
to assume that early detection is beneficial. 20 Defendants, therefore, need
to present to judges and juries the most convincing case they can that early
detection is not beneficial. Defendants in medical surveillance cases, how-
ever, have not yet challenged the presumed benefits of early detection.' 2'
Prior to claims for medical surveillance damages, the issue of early detection
arose primarily in the context of a doctor's delayed diagnosis of cancer.
Such delays often decreased the patient's chance of recovering.12" In those
cases the courts were normally unwilling to accept the premise that early
detection was inconsequential. Thus, the doctor was held liable for his
delayed diagnosis. 23 Since courts were unwilling to accept the argument
that early detection was worthless in other cases, it is unlikely a defendant
in a medical surveillance case will prevail on this issue. Nevertheless,
117. Under the biological predetermination theory, the genes of the cancer victim supposedly
determine whether she will manifest signs or symptoms of cancer, and whether the cancer is
amenable to treatment. 5B LAwYERs' MEDICAL CYCLoPEDIA, supra note 15, § 38.41, at 340-
41.
118. Parver, Defense of Delayed Diagnosis and Treatment of Breast Cancer, 30 MED. TRIAL
Q. 34, 52-56 (1983). These medical authorities argue that because of the manner in which
cancer cells grow and metastasize, by the time a tumor is detectable it has spread to other
parts of the person's body thereby establishing her chances of survival. They contend, therefore,
that early detection does not alter the chances of the person's survival. Id.
119. M. ALDERSON, supra note 111, at 182. This view is supported by research demonstrating
that survival rates of cancer patients has not increased appreciably in "the past 40 years
despite improvements in both diagnostic acumen and therapeutic skills." Parver, supra note
118, at 36-37.
120. See Ayers, 106 N.J. at 603-04, 525 A.2d at 311 ("the value of early diagnosis and
treatment for cancer patients is well-documented").
121. The reported decisions in medical surveillance cases indicate that the defendants have
relied almost exclusively upon the argument that the plaintiff cannot recover medical surveillance
damages without a present physical injury. See, e.g., Friends, 746 F.2d at 824. Defendants
have not challenged plaintiffs' need for medical surveillance testing or the benefits of early
detection. While defendants may be unsuccessful in convincing a jury that early detection is
ineffective, defendants at least should attempt to challenge these assertions.
122. See 5B LAwYERs' MEDICAL CYCLOPEDIA, supra note 15, §§ 38.40, 38.43.
123. See, e.g., Evers, 95 N.J. at 399, 471 A.2d at 405; Jones v. Montefiore Hosp., 494 Pa.
410, 431 A.2d 920 (1981); Gradel v. Inouye, 491 Pa. 534, 421 A.2d 674 (1980); Herskovits v.
Group Health Coop. of Puget Sound, 99 Wash. 2d 609, 664 P.2d 474 (1983).
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defendants should at least consider presenting their own expert witnesses to
counter the plaintiff's experts.
C. Public Policy Justification
In addition to the legal and medical justifications for awarding medical
surveillance damages, courts have relied upon public policy considerations.
The most significant public policy attribute of medical surveillance damages
is that toxic tort victims must not suffer the consequences of a serious, and
possibly fatal, illness before the defendant's tortious conduct is actionable.,-
Allowing medical surveillance damages prevents the gross injustice of having
an individual who, because he lacks the financial wherewithal, must forego
diagnostic testing.'2 Accordingly, the courts have held that requiring a toxic
tort victim to manifest a latent disease before she can maintain an action
for medical surveillance damages is simply unreasonable, and contrary to
public policy.126
Awarding medical surveillance damages not only provides just compen-
sation to toxic tort victims, but also fulfills the tort system's deterrence
function. 27 The toxic tort victim's difficulty in recovering damages when a
disease manifests itself diminishes, if not totally abrogates, any tort-law
deterrence to irresponsible action.12' Consequently, finding toxic substance
manufacturers and disposers liable for medical surveillance damages provides
an incentive for them to minimize the risks and costs resulting from possible
toxic exposures. 12
D. Medical Surveillance Damages as a Solution to Toxic Tort
Victim Compensation
Medical surveillance damages are a manageable and pragmatic solution
to the compensation problems resulting from toxic injuries. Recognizing the
124. Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 189 N.J. Super. 561, 572-73, 461 A.2d 184, 190 (1983),
rev'd in part, aff'd in part, 202 N.J. Super. 106, 493 A.2d 1314 (1985), rev'd in part, aff'd
in part, 106 N.J. 557, 525 A.2d. 287, 312 (1987).
125. See Ayers, 189 N.J. Super. at 572-73, 461 A.2d at 190; Ayers, 106 N.J. at 604-06, 525
A.2d. at 312. While some toxic tort victims can afford medical surveillance testing regardless
of whether their expenses are reimbursed "the lack of reimbursement will undoubtedly deter
others from undergoing medical surveillance." Ayers, 106 N.J. at 604, 525 A.2d at 311.
Medical surveillance testing can be quite expensive. See 106 N.J. at 607 n.13, 525 A.2d at 313
n.13 (average medical surveillance expense for plaintiffs predicted to be approximately $1000
annually).
126. Ayers, 106 N.J. at 604-06, 525 A.2d at 312; Ayers, 189 N.J. Super. at 572-73, 461
A.2d at 190; Askey, 102 A.D.2d at 137, 477 N.Y.S.2d at 247.
127. See Friends, 746 F.2d at 825; Ayers, 106 N.J. at 604-06, 525 A.2d at 311-12.
128. See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
129. For example, in Ayers, medical surveillance damages for the 339 plaintiffs totaled
$8,204,500. Ayers, 106 N.J. at 565, 525 A.2d at 291. See also Note, supra note 91, at 800-01




invasion of an individual's interest in avoiding medical surveillance tests as
a compensable injury provides toxic tort victims with a recovery where
increased risk and fear of disease actions are unavailing. Judicial unwilling-
ness to recognize mere exposure to toxic substances as an injury is predicated
on concerns about the uncertainty of toxic disease manifestation and plain-
tiffs' ability to fabricate their emotional distress. Medical surveillance claims
do not raise these concerns. Where increased risk actions endeavor to recover
damages for the possibility of a future injury, medical surveillance damages
seek to recover for the invasion of an individual's interest in avoiding
medical surveillance testing. Where fear of cancer actions raise the specter
of fraudulent recoveries, medical surveillance claims are predicated on
objectively determinable matters of medical necessity.
Awarding medical surveillance damages also benefits the plaintiff, defen-
dant and all of society by mitigating the toxic tort victim's future injuries.
If a toxic tort victim undergoes medical surveillance testing which results in
the early detection of a latent disease, the overall damages she suffers is
reduced.130 Thus, medical surveillance damages benefit toxic tort victims by
mitigating the personal injuries they suffer, defendants by reducing their
future liability, and society by decreasing the total resources expended.",
Allowing medical surveillance damages also reduces the cost of the liti-
gation barrier to plaintiffs. A toxic tort victim will rationally initiate legal
action only if she calculates that the damage award would probably exceed
the time, effort and actual expense of bringing a lawsuit 32 Due to the
complexities of proving toxic tort claims, however, such litigation is usually
extremely expensive.' 33 Medical surveillance actions reduce the expense of
litigation by decreasing the amount of scientific and expert testimony needed
to prove liability. Therefore, allowing medical surveillance damages permits
the individual plaintiff, or the plaintiff with a small dollar claim, to maintain
an action. 34
Recognizing medical surveillance damages also has advantages in mass
toxic tort cases. In such cases, creation of a medical surveillance fund may
be appropriate. 135 Such a fund would allow the medical authorities moni-
130. See Ayers, 106 N.J. at 604-06, 525 A.2d at 312; M. DoRE, supra note 3, § 7.05, at 7-
10 (advising defendants in cases where the need for medical surveillance is conceded to offer
to pay for the necessary testing regardless of whether the plaintiff has requested medical
surveillance damages in order to reduce the defendant's possible future damages).
131. See Ayers, 106 N.J. at 604-06, 525 A.2d at 312; M. DoRE, supra note 3, § 7.06, at 7-
10.
132. Six CAsE S~rtums, supra note 20, at 494-96.
133. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
134. See Hagerty, 788 F.2d at 319; Herber, 785 F.2d at 79; Johnson, 645 F. Supp. at 764;
Villari, 663 F. Supp. at 727.
135. In Ayers, the court held that in future mass toxic tort exposure cases medical surveillance
damages should be awarded by using court-supervised funds to pay medical surveillance
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toring the exposure victims' health to correlate data on the disease incidence
from exposure to the toxic substance. 36 Creating medical surveillance funds
also assures that changes in medical technology which increase the toxic
tort victim's cost of medical surveillance testing are provided for. Further-
more, in the mass tort context, some courts have shown a willingness to
certify class actions for claims for medical monitoring."3 Class action
certification in medical surveillance cases will help to further reduce the
toxic tort victims' costs.
Medical surveillance damages, however, are not without their drawbacks.
Most significantly the allowance of such claims only provides for toxic tort
victims' medical needs until the disease manifests itself. Thereafter, the
victim is on her own. As has been shown, the barriers to recovery when a
latent disease manifests itself are very substantial." This creates the anomaly
that while the victim has the funds for the early detection of a latent
disease, she may not have the funds to treat the disease when it manifests
itself. Therefore, medical surveillance damages should include treatment
costs to make them a more complete remedy.
The other drawback of medical surveillance damages is that they are an
incomplete remedy. They are incomplete in the sense that the victims of
toxic torts have suffered more harm than incurring the expense of medical
surveillance testing. Nevertheless, until science understands cancer etiology,
medical surveillance damages provides the best solution for balancing the
toxic tort victim's right to compensation and the societal benefits of modern
technology. 139
IV. CTRIA FoR REcoVERY oF MEDICAL SURvEILLAN E DAMAGES
Because allowance of medical surveillance damages is a recent innovation,
courts have not articulated a clear set of requirements for their recovery. 40
expenses as they accrued. Ayers, 106 N.J. at 607-11, 525 A.2d at 313-15. For a discussion of
the utility of court-supervised funds to pay medical expenses of toxic tort victims see Rosenberg,
supra note 1, at 919-24; Trauberman, supra note 5, at 237-46; Increased Risk of Disease,
supra note 57, at 648-52.
136. See Rosenberg, supra note 1, at 922-24.
137. See In Re Three Mile Island Litig., 87 F.R.D. 433 (M.D. Pa. 1980). But see Askey,
102 A.D.2d at 134, 477 N.Y.S.2d at 245-46 (holding class certification inappropriate under
New York class action rules).
138. See supra notes 19-43 and accompanying text.
139. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
140. In Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 106 N.J. 557, 606, 525 A.2d 287, 312 (1987), the
court set out five "critical factors" for evaluating the compensability of medical surveillance
claims. The court did not, however, explain the criteria, their interrelationship, or the weight
given each factor. The court's five factors were: (1) the significance and extent of exposure
to the toxic substance; (2) the toxicity of the substance; (3) the seriousness of the diseases for
which individuals are at risk; (4) the relative increase in the chance of onset of disease in
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The foregoing examination of the legal, medical, and public policy justifi-
cations for medical surveillance damages supports the establishment of three
specific criteria for their recovery.141 In order to recover medical surveillance
damages, the plaintiff must prove to the trier of fact:
1. Actual exposure to a hazardous substance through the negligent
actions of the defendant.
2. As a proximate result of exposure an increased risk of manifesting
a serious latent disease requiring her to undergo medical surveillance
examinations.
3. The existence of a medical test which makes early detection of
the latent diseases possible and a treatment which can alter the natural
history of the disease.
Each of these elements must be established through expert testimony.1 42 A
plaintiff's failure to prove any of these elements should lead to the denial
of medical surveillance damages. 143
A. Actual Exposure to a Hazardous Substance Through the
Negligent Actions of the Defendant
This first element requires the plaintiff to prove three things: first,
exposure to the substance in question; second, that the substance is hazard-
ous; and, finally, that her exposure was the result of the defendant's
those exposed; (5) the value of early diagnosis. 106 N.J. at 606, 525 A.2d at 312. The three
part test set forth here incorporates most of these factors, but also sets specific requirements
and burdens for their proof and does not rely on an amorphous balancing of factors. See
also Jones, Increased Risk of Disease, in PREPARATIo AND TRIAL OF A CoMPLEx Toxic
CHEbcAL oR HAzARDoUrs WAsTE CAsE 299 (S. Birnbaum & R. Phelan eds. 1984) (discussing
threshold questions in medical surveillance cases).
141. A plaintiff, of course, must clearly seek medical surveillance damages in her pleadings.
See Destories v. City of Phoenix, 744 P.2d 705, 711-12 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987) (affirming the
grant of summary judgment in action for medical surveillance damages because of insufficient
pleading).
142. See Herber v. Johns-Manville Corp., 785 F.2d 79, 83 (1986); Friends for All Children,
Inc. v. Lockheed, 746 F.2d 816, 826 n.15 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Ayers, 106 N.J. at 604-06, 525
A.2d at 312; Askey v. Occidental Chem. Corp., 102 A.D.2d 130, 137, 477 N.Y.S.2d 242
(1984). Of course, some elements will not always require expert testimony. For example, in
Hagerty v. L. & L. Marine Sers., Inc., the plaintiff was twice drenched with dripolene, a
chemical containing known toxins benzene, toluene and xylene. 788 F.2d 315, 317, reh'g
denied, 797 F.2d 256 (5th Cir. 1986). In such a case expert testimony is not needed to prove
plaintiff's exposure to the toxic substance. Compare Ayers, 106 N.J. at 605, 525 A.2d at 292
(expert testimony necessary to prove that plaintiff's wells had been contaminated by defendant's
improper operation of landfill).
143. See Hendrix v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc. 776 F.2d 1492, 1506-07 (11th Cir. 1985)
(holding it was an error to award medical surveillance damages when, during a 16-day trial,
only one item of evidence was introduced concerning the plaintiff's future medical expenses).
See also Mergunthaler v. Asbestos Corp. of Am., 480 A.2d 647, 651 (Del. 1984) (asbestos
workers' wives who failed to prove their asbestos exposure were not entitled to recover for
medical surveillance damages as a result of their alleged contact with asbestos fibers in
laundering their spouses' work clothes).
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negligence. The first part of this requirement-exposure-is necessary in
order for the plaintiff to establish that she has suffered a compensable
harm. 144 Without proof of exposure to the hazardous substance there is no
need for medical surveillance testing. Proving exposure will often be the
plaintiff's easiest obligation. 45 Problems in proving exposure may arise,
however, in cases involving an indirect or distant exposure.'"
To establish a prima facie case that a substance is harmful, the plaintiff
has the threshold burden of providing some evidence that the substance is
hazardous.147 Once the plaintiff makes out a prima facie case, the burden
should shift to the defendant to prove the substance is in fact harmless
and, therefore, the plaintiff should not receive medical surveillance damages.
The uncertain etiology of cancer and other toxic substance exposure ailments
necessitates shifting the burden of proof. Requiring the toxic tort plaintiff
to carry the burden of proving a substance's harmful nature would cause
the same difficulties as currently exist under the common law causation
requirement. 4' It would, therefore, make medical surveillance damages a
144. Under the Ayers court's first factor, the plaintiff would seemingly need to establish
not merely exposure to the toxic substance, but a "significant" exposure. See supra note 140.
The court's probable concern was preventing plaintiffs with insignificant exposures from
receiving medical surveillance damages. The requirement that the plaintiff have an increased
risk of disease addresses this concern. See infra notes 148-49 and accompanying text. The
correct place to address this concern is under this aspect of the test, not the exposure aspect.
The exposure aspect is created to deny those individuals who have no exposure at all, not
those with trivial exposures. If an exposure is insignificant, the plaintiff will not have an
increased risk of disease and will be denied any recovery by that aspect of the test.
145. See Hagerty, 788 F.2d at 315; Villari v. Terminix Int'l, Inc., 663 F. Supp. 727, 728-
29 (E.D. Pa. 1987).
146. See Mergunthaler, 480 A.2d at 651. The court, while correctly dismissing the action
because the plaintiffs failed to show exposure to the asbestos, also based its decision on the
plaintiffs' lack of direct contact with the asbestos. The rejection of medical surveillance actions
simply on the basis of indirect contact misunderstands the nature of the injury suffered in a
medical surveillance case. The issue in a medical surveillance case is not direct contact, but
the need for medical surveillance testing. If the plaintiff can prove that because of the
defendants' exposing her to a toxic substance she needs to undergo medical surveillance testing,
she should be allowed to recover damages. The portion of the Mergunthaler decision concerning
indirect contact also ignored the fact that the threat to life from breathing asbestos extends
in some degree to any individual exposed to the asbestos dust. B. CAS M N, supra note 14,
at 363-67. See also Askey, 102 A.D.2d 130, 477 N.Y.S.2d 242. The court affirmed the denial
of class certification for the purpose of determining the class' right to recover medical
surveillance damages. The court rejected class certification because the plaintiffs could not
show which members of the class had actually been exposed to a toxic substance emanating
from the landfill. 102 A.D.2d at 138, 477 N.Y.S.2d at 248.
147. See Ginsberg & Weiss, supra note 5, at 865 n.17 (on the difficulties of definition). For
a useful definition of hazardous, see the Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6903(5) (1983).
The statute defines hazardous waste as a substance "which because of its quantity, concentra-
tion, or physical, chemical, or infectious characteristic may ... cause, or significantly contribute
to an increase in serious irreversible, or incapacitating reversible illness ... ." Id. § 6903(5)(a).
This requirement encompasses the Ayers court's second factor. See supra note 140. For an
example of a plaintiff successfully establishing the hazardous nature of the substance to which
he was exposed, see Ayers, 106 N.J. at 588-89, 525 A.2d at 303.
148. See supra notes 21-26 and accompanying text.
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pyrrhic remedy for toxic tort victims. Finally, the plaintiff must show that
her exposure was caused by the defendant's negligent actions. 149
B. As a Proximate Result of Exposure the Plaintiff Has an
Increased Risk of Manifesting a Serious Latent Disease Requiring
Her to Undergo Medical Surveillance Examinations
This aspect of a medical surveillance case consists of two issues: first,
whether the plaintiff has an increased risk of disease; and, second, whether
the potential future disease is serious. 50 Proving the existence of an increased
risk of disease is essential to a medical surveillance case. The plaintiff must
prove that her exposure to the hazardous substance has increased her risk
of disease, and that detection of any future ailment requires medical
surveillance testing. If there is no possibility of an exposure related ailment
developing in the future, the plaintiff should only be entitled to damages
for testing that was performed for the purpose of determining whether she
is suffering from any current ailment.' 5'
A question arises about the quantum of increased risk of disease necessary
for the plaintiff to recover. The court in Ayers v. Township of Jackson
suggested that any increased risk is sufficient to justify medical surveillance
damages. 52 This suggestion should be adopted. The injury of incurring
medical surveillance expenses exists whenever a plaintiff has an increased
risk of future disease, even if the increased risk is marginal. Furthermore,
because it is scientifically impossible to quantify the amount of increased
risk suffered by toxic tort victims, requiring toxic tort plaintiffs to show a
specific quantifiable increased risk of disease would, in effect, prevent toxic
tort victims from recovering medical surveillance damages. 53 Therefore, if
medical surveillance damages are to be a viable recovery for toxic tort
victims, any increased risk of disease is sufficient basis for recovery.
The second part of this element is proof of a serious disease. This
requirement prevents the recovery of medical surveillance damages when
the anticipated injury is trivial. The recovery of medical surveillance damages
should be predicated upon the increased risk of a serious injury, most often
149. See, e.g., Hagerty, 788 F.2d at 317 (defendant's conduct was negligent); Ayers, 106
N.J. at 565, 525 A.2d at 291 (defendant's conduct was palpably unreasonable).
150. These requirements are similar to the Ayers court's factors three and four. See supra
note 140.
151. See Laxton v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 639 S.W.2d 431, 434 (Tenn. 1982) (allowing
recovery of the cost of medical tests notwithstanding that the tests results were negative).
152. Ayers, 106 N.J. at 604-06, 525 A.2d at 312. The New Jersey Supreme Court in Ayers
rejected the Appellate Court's holding which required a plaintiff seeking to recover medical
surveillance damages plaintiff needed to quantify the amount of his increased risk of disease.
106 N.J. at 599, 525 A.2d at 309.
153. See Note, supra note 91, at 802-03.
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cancer. This requirement, in essence, parallels the one requiring the substance
to be hazardous.'54 That is, if the substance is harmless then it probably
will not cause the future manifestation of a serious injury. As a check on
awards of medical surveillance damages, and because of the still unknown
effect of many toxic substances on humans, the plaintiff should prove the
seriousness of the latent aliments for which early detection is sought.
C. The Existence of a Medical Test Which Makes Early Detection
of the Latent Diseases Possible and a Treatment Which Can Alter
the Natural History of the Disease
Unless a sufficiently sensitive and specific medical test exists to detect the
future ailment, no future medical surveillance testing should be performed
and no damages awarded. 55 The standard for acceptance of such a test
should be whether a "respectable minority" of physicians recognize the test
as beneficial in the early detection of latent toxic substance diseases.156 This
standard is appropriate since the defendant should not be required to provide
the plaintiff with untried tests of speculative value. The mere existence of
a test which could possibly assist in the early detection of a latent disease
is an inadequate basis for awarding medical surveillance damages. If early
detection is not possible, no damages should be awarded. Additionally, the
plaintiff must establish that the tests she needs to undergo are required
because of her exposure. That is, but for the defendant's exposing her to
the hazardous substance she would not have undergone these tests. 57 De-
fendants should not have to pay for tests which the plaintiff would have
undergone regardless of her exposure.158
154. See supra notes 147-49 and accompanying text.
155. See M. ALDERSON, supra note 111, at 182; Ashford, supra note 107, at 277-82.
156. This is the general test courts have adopted in determining whether treatment undertaken
by a physician meets the medical profession's standard of care. See, e.g., Sprowl v. Ward,
441 So. 2d 898, 900 (Ala. 1983); Downer v. Veilleux, 322 A.2d 82, 84 (Me. 1974); In Ayers,
the court apparently adopted a standard that testing must be "consistent with contemporary
scientific principles." 106 N.J. at 599, 525 A.2d at 309. It is uncertain if this was the standard
the court was adopting or merely its characterization of the proof provided by the plaintiffs.
157. See M. DORE, supra note 3, § 7.05[2], at 7-9-10. In Ayers, the defendant did not object
to the trial court's allowing the jury to consider the cost of both conventional and noncon-
ventional tests. 106 N.J. at 607 n.13, 525 A.2d at 313 n.13. On appeal the defendants raised
the issue but the New Jersey Supreme Court refused to find that the trial court had committed
plain error in permitting the jury to consider both costs. Id. This serves as a warning to
defendants to bring the issue up at trial since they are unlikely to win it on appeal.
158. For example, it is recommended that all women over age 40 have a yearly mammograin
to detect breast cancer. See 5B LAwYERs' MNIEicA. CYcLoPanrA, supra note 15, § 38.43, at
345. Defendants should not have to pay for these types of tests since the plaintiff's exposure
to the toxic substance did not cause them to undergo these tests. See Friends, 746 F.2d at
826-27 (rejecting Lockheed's contention that the plaintiff's need for diagnostic testing would
have existed regardless of Lockheed's negligence).
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The existence of a workable treatment is another prerequisite to the
recovery of medical surveillance damages. 59 A damage award is appropriate
only if early detection allows for a treatment that can ultimately alleviate
the ailment. However, as to diseases which cannot adequately be treated,
medical surveillance testing is useless and an award of medical surveillance
damages unwarranted.
CONCLUSION
Toxic tort injuries, because of their unique attributes, do not fit into the
common-law model of injuries. The inability of toxic torts to fit within the
common law model produces substantial barriers for toxic tort victims to
receive adequate compensation for their injuries. The solutions so far
proposed for solving the problem of inadequate compensation call for radical
surgery on the tort system. Instead of making these changes, adoption of
the common law's solution of medical surveillance damages is preferable.
Medical surveillance damages provide the victims of toxic torts with a
pre-manifestation recovery for their injuries. The courts have rejected other
pre-manifestation recoveries because of the uncertainty of their occurrence
and the ease with which they can be fabricated. Medical surveillance claims
do not pose either of these problems. Medical surveillance damages are
predicated on objectively determinable matters of medical necessity. Sound
legal, medical and public policy considerations support awards of medical
surveillance damages. These considerations justify allowing toxic tort victims
to recover the medical testing expenses they will incur to facilitate the early
detection of toxic exposure ailments.
ALLAN T. SLAGEL
159. See M. ALDERSON, supra note 111, at 182.
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